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The Treasury Report on Foundations:
Methods of Enforcing Compliance
Thomas R. Allen*
Mr. Allen discusses the various sanctions which might be used to
implement the proposals made in the 1965 Treasury Report on Private
Foundations and suggests which sanctions would be most appropriate.
His conclusion dwells on the theme that imposition of the tax is not
necessarily the wisest sanction. Viewing the Treasury proposal as a
call for wide reform in the charitablefoundation field, the author would
prefer that sanctions be limited to these designed to induce state action.

I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about philanthropy, and in particular about philanthropic
foundations, seems to go through a cyclical pattern: a period of quiet
contentment, and then a time of alarm and crisis.1

If Professor Sacks is correct in his cyclical view of the public concern over charitable foundations, the present period must surely
be classed as one of maximum turbulence. At the moment both
houses of Congress have had presented to them proposals for levying
new restrictions on charitable foundations through the tax law,2 a

flood of law review comments has appeared, 3 and at the state level
new legislation, partly directed to control of charitable foundations,
a Member, Tennessee Bar; Associate, Anderson, Rush, Dean & Lowndes, Orlando,
Florida; former Managing Editor, Vanderbilt Law Review, 1961-62.
1. Sacks, Use and Misuse of the Private Foundation, N.Y.U. 5TH CONFERENCE ON
CHARTABLE FOUNDATIONS 203 (1961).
2. CanmiA s REPORT TO THE SELECT Comm. ON SMALL BUSINESS OF TnE HousE
OF REPRESENTATIVFS, 87Tr & 88TH toNGs., TAx-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABJLE

TRtSTS: THEm IMpAcT oN OuR ECONOMY (Comm. Print: ist installment, 1962; 2nd
installment, 1963; 3rd installment, 1964) [hereinafter cited as PA'mAN REPORT];
S NATE Com-m. ON FiNANCE, 89TH CoNG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON PRrVATE FOUNDATIONS
(Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as TrixAsuRy REPORT]. The hearings conducted by Mr. Patman after the issuance of the last volume of the Patman Report may
be found in Hearings Before Subcommittee No. I on Foundations of the Select Conmittee on Small Business of the House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Patman Hearings].
3. E.g., Folk, Regulation of Charitable Foundations-The Patman and Treasury
Reports, 20 Bus. LA'w. 1015 (1965); Karst, The Tax Exemption of Donor-Controlled
Foundations, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 183 (1964); Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, Comment on the
Patnan Report, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 190 (1963); Schoenfeld, Initial Impressions of the
Treasury Report on Foundations, 14 CLEv.-MAR, L. REv. 286 (1965). No article
found has directly considered the problem of appropriate sanctions for the Treasury
Report. Some of the ideas for sanctions in this paper were suggested by a representative of the Treasury Department.
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has been proposed, and in some cases adopted.4
The most comprehensive reappraisal of the area since 1950, the
U.S. Treasury Report on Private Foundations,5 is the subject of this
paper. More specifically, after a general review of the background of
the problem, this paper will discuss the various sanctions (tax or otherwise) 6 which might be used to implement the proposals made in the
Treasury Report, the problems attendant to each sanction, and a mild
attempt will be made to select the most appropriate sanctions.
The importance of the Treasury Report, its proposals and possible
implementations, is reflected in the following statistics for 1962, the
last year in which a comprehensive survey of charitable foundations
was made.7 In that year there were approximately 15,000 private
foundations, 8 almost two-thirds of which were created after 1959.'
These foundations had assets valued at over sixteen billion dollars, 10
and an income, including capital gains, in excess of one billion dollars." And of the eight billion dollars contributed13to charity in 1962,12
833 million dollars went to private foundations.
As this paper is concerned primarily with sanctions, only those
proposals in the Treasury Report for which no sanctions are specified
will be treated. These are five in number:
1. Private foundations would be prohibited from dealing with any
substantial contributor (including corporation officials), any officer,
director, or trustee of the foundation, or any party closely related to
them, except to pay reasonable compensation for necessary services
and to make incidental purchases of supplies.
2. A private, non-operating foundation (as defined in section 170
(g) (2) (B)) would be required to distribute the full amount of its
current net income by the end of the year following the year in which
such income was earned. Or, if such foundation's income falls below
a prescribed percentage of the value of its holdings, the foundation
4. UN-onm SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES Ar. At the
beginning of 1965 three states, California, Michigan, and Oregon had adopted the
Act. UNwoi LAWS ANN. 138 (Supp. 1964).
5. TREAsURsY REPORT, supra note 2. For the origins of the Treasury Report, see
Schoenfeld, supra note 3, at 286 n.2.
6. The Treasury apparently believes that these proposals and their sanctions can be
appropriately subsumed under the federal tax laws. TREAsuRY REPORT 14. This paper
assumes that this view is not necessarily correct, and examines non-tax sanctions and
other approaches to the problem, as well as tax sanctions.
7. This survey was made by the Treasury Department and is reported in the Treasury
Report.
8. TREASURY REPORT 74, table 7.

9. Ibid.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
Id. at 79, table 10.
Id. at 67, table 2.
Id. at 79, table 10.
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would be required to contribute the difference out of its corpus. Two
recommended exceptions would allow the foundation (1) to accumulate income to the extent it had in a speciified prior period expended
amounts in excess of its income, and (2) to accumulate income for a
specified period if necessary to the accomplishment of a charitable
purpose.
3. Private foundations would be prohibited from owning either
twenty per cent or more of the total combined voting power or twenty
per cent or more of the value of the equity of a corporation, if the
corporation's business is not substantially related to the exempt
functions of the foundation. If the business is unincorporated, a twenty
per cent or larger interest in the capital or profits of the business
would be forbidden. Interests in such businesses held (e.g., by a trust
arrangement) for the foundation would be attributed to it. Foundations would be given a reasonable time to divest themselves of such
interests. Certain interests of a passive nature, such as the earning
of interest, holdings of royalties and mineral production payments and
certain leases would be exempted from the term "business." In addition, the three exceptions in section 513 of the Code (e.g., work
carried on without compensation) would also be applicable to this
proposal.
4. Three proposals relating to financial transactions unrelated to
charitable functions are subsumed here: (1) all foundation borrowing for investment purposes would be prohibited, although borrowing
in order to carry out an exempt function would be allowed, as would
investment transactions already in progress; (2) foundation loans
would be confined to categories which are clearly necessary, safe, and
appropriate for charitable fiduciaries, although again if the loan is in
pursuance of an exempt purpose, (e.g., loans to students) it may be
made; (3) foundations would be prohibited from trading and speculating with any of their assets, whether corpus or income.
5. The donor of a foundation, his family, employees, and business
associates would be barred after twenty-five years from comprising
more than twenty-five per cent of the managing board of the foundation.
The report from which these proposals are taken was made by the
Treasury at the request of Congress. On four previous occasions in
the last sixteen years Congress has inquired into the role of charitable
foundations. The first investigation, 14 in 1949, was primarily con14. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of the U.S. Senate on Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H. Mills and
Operations of Textron, Inc., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); S. REP. No. 101, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-39 (1950).
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cerned with the operations of Textron, Inc., and its use of charitable
foundations. The disclosures made therein were primarily responsible
for the passage of sections 502-04 and 511-15 of our present Code, the
first, and so far the only, substantial restrictions on foundation activities. In 1953 and 1954 the so-called Cox15 and Reece 16 Committees
intensively investigated charitable foundations in response to charges
that foundations were being used to further the purposes of Communists, leftists, liberals and others on the left side of the political
spectrum. Comparatively little attention was given to other abuses
or to the revision of the tax laws, and no new legislation resulted.
Almost a decade later, the now famous Patman Report was issued."
This study, in the form of a report by Mr. Patman to his committee,
recommended sweeping, and sometimes radical, changes in the laws
governing charitable foundations. This report was the moving force
behind the request for the Treasury Report.18
II. SANCTIONS IN GENERAL

Before turning to a consideration of the specific proposals and
appropriate sanctions for each, several matters of general application
merit discussion.
A. State Regulation
Although the above-listed proposals cover areas which are of legitimate concern to the federal taxing authorities, these are areas which
traditionally have been regulated by state law. For example, the
proposals concerning self-dealing, delay in benefit to charity, and
improper financial transactions sound in the area of state law of trusts
and fiduciary responsibility. If for some reason proper control of such
activities cannot be maintained at the state level, then the federal
government would seem to have some obligation to regulate such
matters, both because of its interest in protecting the revenues, and
also because the federal government through its tax policy has in
large part been responsible for the growth of modern day foundations.' 9 With this residual federal responsibility in mind,20 the follow15. Hearings Before the Select Committee To Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations
and Comparable Organizations of the House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1953); H.R. REP. No. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953).
16. Hearings Before the Special Committee To Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations
and Comparable Organizations of the House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1954); H.R. REP. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
17. PATm N REPonT, supranote 2.
18. Schoenfeld, supra note 3, at 286 n.2. Consequently, the Patman Report is
especially relevant in construing the Treasury Report.
19. "The unknown, but certainly rising, number of family foundations are a product
of the tax structure." KYssN, PERSONAL DEDUCONS IN" THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67
(1960).
20. This is the underlying rationale of the Treasury Report: "Since the Federal tax
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ing questions must be asked: Have the states effectively regulated
these areas? If not, what are the prospects for such regulation, and
what can the federal government do to promote such regulation?
While the situation in some states is better than in others, the
overall view is dismal, for several reasons. 21 The law of charities is
itself unsettled, and can be found only by consulting a state's tax,
corporation, and trust laws. Where a charitable foundation is involved,
there is the additional problem of determining whether state trust
law, the usual vehicle for supervision of charities, including foundations, is applicable to foundations organized as corporations. Whatever
the applicable law, the supervision of all charities is relegated to the
state attorney general, there being no determinable beneficiaryz of a
charity with standing to bring suit. But the attorney general in most
states has no practical way to determine even the existence of all
the foundations subject to the state's jurisdiction, let alone a method
of effectively examining foundation activity for abuses. In addition,
a state attorney general "is also hampered by the common problems
laws have played a significant part in the growth of foundations, an unavoidable
responsibility rests upon the Federal Government to do what it reasonably can to
insure that these organizations operate in a manner conducive to the fulfillment of
their purposes." TREASURY REPORT 14.

21. For general discussion of the many problems in state regulation of charitable
foundations, see Fremont-Smith, Government Supervision and Accountability of Foundations, N.Y.U. 6vsH CONFERMEcE ON CHruTrABLE FOUNDAnTONS 69 (1963); Karst, The
Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HAsv. L.
REv. 433 (1960).
22. In Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955), a group of
private citizens sought unsuccessfully to mandamus the state attorney general to have
him "reconsider" his decision not to take action against a charity. This approach is
somewhat similar to a sanction suggested by the Reece Committee: "As it is obvious
that the Internal Revenue Service cannot, except at prohibitive cost, follow the activities of the individual foundations to ascertain whether violations of law exist, this
Committee believes that some additional method should be established to protect
the people against a misuse of the public funds which foundation money represents.
An interesting suggestion has been made, which deserves careful study, that legal
procedure should be available in the Federal courts under which a citizen could
bring a proceeding to compel the Attorney General to take action against a foundation
upon a showing, to the satisfaction of a Federal judge, that a prima facie or probable
cause exists." H.R. REP. No. 2681, supra note 16, at 216. Another novel idea has been
suggested by Professor Simon: "Even if these proposals were adopted there might still
be some attorney generals too overworked or too disinterested to take action. If that
should happen in a notorious case, I wonder whether the local United States Attorney
could not initiate the proceeding in state court. Does only the state sovereign stand
as parens patriae to charity's beneficiaries? Does not the federal tax indulgence improve
the United States' claim to this prosecuting role. These are questions deserving of
further considerations in the event of flagrant laxity by a state attorney general." 1
HousE COMM. ON WAYS A" MEANS, 89mr CONG., 1ST SESS., WRITTEN STATEMENTS
BY INTERESTED INDIvMUALS AND ORGANIzAnONS ON TREAsURY DEP'T REP. 459-60
(Comm. Print 1965)

[hereinafter cited as TREAsURY REPORT STATMENTS].

All these

approaches have the virtue of not being dependent upon the state attorney general for
initiation of action.
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of all state administrators, a multitude of duties to perform, insufficient
help and inadequate funds."
One hopeful augury for the future is the Uniform Supervision of

Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act, which would give the state
attorney general broad powers of investigation, enforcement, rulemaking, and disclosure. At present, however, the Act has been adopted
24
by only three states.
Some action by the federal government therefore seems necessary.

For foundations not now in existence, as a condition of exemption it
might be required that the foundation's charter or trust instrument

contain whatever restriction the Treasury deems desirable for insuring
the proper use of the exemption.2 5 Such an approach would make
it clear that a failure by a foundation official to comply with federal

law would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. It would be
particularly useful for implementing those proposals which involve

activities not prohibited by state law, such as a donor's retaining full
control after twenty-five years, or the foundation's borrowing for

investment. Moreover, by specifically proscribing certain activities
by charter, the Treasury could insure that its proposals would be
carried out uniformly without subjection to the vagaries of state law.
For foundations already in existence, the problem is more difficult,

and perhaps less should be expected from federal attempts to spark
state action than in the case of new foundations. One possible
restriction would be a denial of the tax exemption to all foundations
within a state not having an effective system for the supervision of
its foundations.26 The states could be given a reasonable period of
23. Fremont-Smith, supra note 21, at 79.
24. See note 4 supra. Another possibility for the future is self-regulation. See
generally Caplin, A Code of Practice is Needed, N.Y.U. 7TH CONFERENCE ON CHAIUTABLE FOUNDATIONS 237 (1965); 1 TnREtrsuR REPORT STATEMENTS 165. This was the
hope of the Reece Committee, H.R. REP. No. 2681, supra note 16, at 212. In the
absence of outside pressure, self-regulation seems unlikely.
25. This idea has been suggested by the New York State Bar Association Section on
Taxation. 2 TnnxtsuRy REPORT STATEmENTs 713-14.
26. The following comments of Fremont-Smith are relevant on this point:
"It might be possible for Congress to permit the Revenue Service to withhold application of federal sanctions if a state has established a program that meets certain standards
and has taken jurisdiction of a particular case.
A financial incentive to the states, would, of course, be even more effective. It could
take the form of a provision whereby, if a federal statute is violated, the charitable
funds will be subject to a confiscatory tax unless the state takes steps to rectify the
violation. Theoretically, a state should be interested enough in preserving funds donated
for the benefit of its citizens to act to preserve them, but there is no guarantee of this.
"Most effective would be direct federal aid to states that have established programs
which meet federally enacted requirements, perhaps similar to the provisions under
which the federal unemployment insurance programs are administered." Fremont-Smith,
State Supervision of Foundation Activities, N.Y.U. 7TH CONFERENCE ON CIHAITABLE
FOuNDATIONS 223, 235-36 (1965).
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time (e.g., two years) to pass necessary legislation, the nature of
which might be left to the Treasury for determination. An obvious
possibility would be the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act, or something similarY
While adoption of this Act would not be an effective sanction for
28
the Treasury Report proposals not already prohibited by state law,
perhaps its passage would eliminate the need for such restrictions. If
not, the exemption could also be conditioned on passage of additional
state legislation requiring existing foundations to comply with these
proposals. However, state and federal constitutional questions may
lurk here. For while the federal government can deny exemption to
a foundation, for example, for borrowing for investment, this is only
a question of denying that which was a matter of legislative grace to
begin with. It is an entirely different matter for a state (or the
federal government for that matter) by statute to change the terms
of a private trust instrument governing private property, especially
when the reason for such a law would be the state's desire for its
foundations to receive the federal tax exemption.2 9 In such a case some
reliance might be placed on the doctrine of cy pres.
This sanction, of course, depends upon the likelihood of state
compliance. Such compliance would probably be forthcoming, for a
substantial amount of the states' welfare burden is no doubt carried
by foundations, and loss of the federal tax exemption would greatly
restrict the activities of such foundations, without providing a counterbalancing tax revenue (as it would for the federal government).
Such a sanction would not be radical in its approach. There are
analogies in various federal-state "matching-grant" programs. And a
most recent approach of this nature is found in the 1964 amendments
Cf. H.R. REP. No. 2681, supra note 16, at 215: "A sensible alternative to the
imposition of the retroactive penalty described above [loss of exemption] ...would be
the immediate removal of the trustees or directors. This is primarily a matter of state
lav, and the Federal government could not force such removal. It could, however, we
believe, provide that the retroactive penalty be assessed unless all the trustees or
directors forthwith resign and arrangements are made for the election of directors
appointed by a court or an agency of the state of incorporation or of the situs of the
trust."
27. Another possibility would be a state regulatory agency. Karst, supra note 21, at
476. Fremont-Smith approves of this idea, but states: "I believe it unrealistic to expect
any large number of states to create and staff such new agencies at the present."
Fremont-Smith, supra note 21, at 62. See the views of a Texas attorney general, 1
PATrau

RBPoTT vi-vii.

28. The Uniform Act levies no new restrictions on foundations. Consequently, its
passage would be irrelevant, for example, to the broadening of foundation management
proposal.
29. This can be focused by thinking of the situation where the clear intent of the
donor at the time of the creation of the foundation was that it should be managed by
members of his family, whether or not this would cost the foundation its tax exemption.
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to the Securities Exchange Act. 3° In applying the Act for the first time
to securities other than those listed on a national exchange, a special
exception was made for insurance company securities. This exception
was conditioned upon the insurance companies being regulated in
their state of domicile under standards similar to those set out in
the Securities Exchange Act. The states were given two years to
pass necessary legislation.31 A similar method could be used for
motivating state action in the foundation field.
B. FederalRegulatory Agency
An obvious federal approach of a non-tax nature would be the
creation of a new federal regulatory agency for charitable foundations.
The Treasury Report specifically rejects this idea:
The Treasury Department does not, however, recommend that any separate
Federal regulatory agency be created to supervise foundations. Rather, the
Department is of the view that the effort should be made to frame the tax
32
laws themselves to curb abuses.

This comment was no doubt made in specific response to the proposal
for such an agency made in the Patman Report.33 Mr. Patman was
especially interested in this proposal, as indicated by the space given it
therein and by his statement that he was "especially disappointed that
the Treasury turned down the idea of supervision by a special government agency."3 Mr. Patman's strong support for such an agency, as
well as calls for a state regulatory agency by other critics of foundations,- suggests that the problems involved may be too complex for
effective supervision by the federal tax laws.
In discussion of a federal regulatory agency for charitable foundations, mention is often made of the British system.3 Briefly, the
Charitable Trust Acts of 1853, 1855, and 1860, created an independent
board separate from the Court of Chancery, which until that time had
had sole control over charitable trusts. This board, called the Charity
Commissioners, has advisory and supervisory powers, subject to appeal
to the Court of Chancery on quasi-judicial matters. Among the board's
30. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 78 Stat. 565, 15 U.S.C. 78(c) (1964).
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(2)(G), 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1964).
32. TntrAx REPoRT 14.
33. 1 PATM AN REPORT 134, recommendation 17(a).
34. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 9, 1965, p. 3, col. 1.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. The best and most comprehensive study of the English system is found in
Charitable Trusts Committee, Report, Cmd. No. 8710 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
NATmAN REPoRT]. The following discussion in the text is based on the Nathan
Report.
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chief powers are the authority to require submission of annual accounts, to control dealings in land by charitable trusts, and the
quasi-judicial power to make "schemes" within the cy pres doctrine. 37
An intensive study of the Charity Commissioners and charitable trusts
in general was made in the early fifties by a Royal Commission. In
1952 the results of the Commission's work were published in the
so-called Nathan Report,38 which made the following judgment of
the efficacy of the system:
We think that the setting up of a parallel body [Charity Commissioners] to
the Court of Chancery has been fully justified, and that the powers and
duties conferred by the Charitable Trusts Acts, so far as they have extended,
have stood the test of time. Above all, by requiring the submission of annual
accounts and the consent of the Commissioners to dealings in land by
charitable trustees, charitable funds have been, and are, brought into the
open or at any rate much farther into the open than they were a hundred
years ago. Charitable trust property has been husbanded through the control
of land dealing, and by and large it seems clear that dishonest administration of charitable trusts is now almost non-existant.39

Does this system have any relevance for proponents of a national
regulatory body for charitable foundations in this country? The
following factors suggest a negative answer. In the first place, in the
British unitary, non-federal system of government all functions of
government are centrally controlled at the national level, whereas
under our federal system such functions are split, and the regulation
of charities has traditionally and constitutionally been thought to be a
state matter. As a matter of politics, the creation of such an agency
seems unlikely; 40 and on grounds purely of the desirability of such an
agency, there is plenty of room for argument:
37. Id. at 25.
38. Supra note 36. Many of the recommendations of this report were adopted in
the Charities Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58.
39. NATHAN REPORT 26.
40. The Treasury Report readily admits that most foundations comply fully with the
law, and that abuses are committed only by a small minority: "[M]ost private foundations act responsibly and contribute significantly to the improvement of our society.
Because of the very nature of their activities and aims, precise judgment is impossible
upon the extent to which foundations have realized their potentialities for creative and
dynamic charitable works. It seems clear, however, that their endeavors have been
conducive to important advancements in education, health, science, the arts, religion,
and assistance to the needy and unfortunate." T.AsuRtY REPORT 13. Ex-Commissioner Caplin has stated: "Based upon Internal Revenue Service studies, the overall
record of foundations emerges as a good one. Foundations as a whole stack up well
against any other group of taxpayers-corporations or otherwise." Caplin, supra note
24, at 240.
Consequently, it may be expected that the guiltless foundations will be more than
a little concerned with the Treasury proposals, which of course will apply as well to
the innocent as to the guilty. A casual perusal of TE.Asumry REPORT STATEMENTS, supra
note 22, justifies this conclusion. The pressure that foundations can generate in
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I would suggest that the major drawback to the establishment of a federal
agency would be the withdrawal of enforcement from the local community.
Many foundations are limited by their charter to making gifts within a
defined geographical area. Even if not so limited by their creating instrument, trustees and directors often make primarily local benefactions. There
is an advantage, therefore, in having as supervisory officials, those who are
closest to the area of the potential recipient. This is particularly true when
there is a need for application of the doctrine of cy pres. 41

C. CriminalPenaltiesand Excise Tax
Two highly specific sanctions, which might be used separately or
in conjunction with other sanctions in implementing all of the pro-

posals, are criminal penalties and a non-income tax upon the donors,
42
trustees, etc., who perpetrate a proscribed act.

In most cases criminal sanctions would be inappropriate because of
the conflict between the strict requirements of proof and definition of
offense in criminal cases on the one hand, and the comparatively
uncertain nature of some of the conduct to be prohibited, on the
other (e.g., what is a "speculative" transaction, or an improper
accumulation). Furthermore, there is a problem of determining
what should be the exact penalty. Imprisonment seems unduly
harsh in most cases. 43 A fine appears less so, but then this depends,
to a large extent, upon the amount of the fine. If it is a specific
amount, it will be too harsh for some and ignored by others. A fine
opposition to the proposals is suggested in the following comment by the late Congressman B. Carroll Reece, who tilted with foundations in the investigation cited in note
16 supra and accompanying text: "The obstacles were obvious from the first. We knew
that the influential 'liberal' press, characterized by the New York Times, the New
York Herald Tribune, and the Washington Post-Times Herald, would throw its editorial power against the Committee. We knew that even the bulk of the conservative
press could not be unmindful of the enormous power of these foundations. We knew that
many prominent educators, regardless of what they felt, could not be unmindful of
the dependency of their institutions upon continued largess from the foundations
involved. We knew that the group of prominent men whose decisions would have to
be judged extended even to intimates of the White House." Reece, Preface to
WoR-sEsa,
FONDATIONS: Timm Pow-a AND INFLUENcE at v (1958).
41. Fremont-Smith, supranote 21, at 91-92.
42. Mr. Patman has indicated an interest in direct penalties on foundation officials,
donors, etc.: "Q. [Written questions submitted to Commissioner Caplin] Under
the code, are trustees of a tax-exempt foundation subject to any personal penalty, if
they engage in prohibited transactions? A. The code makes no provision for imposing
a personal penalty against a trustee or trustees of a tax-exempt foundation if it engages
in a prohibited transaction." 1 PATMAN REPo-r 73. However, his "recommendations,"
id. at 133-35, do not include a proposal for such sanctions.
43. The Treasury Report itself suggests that in some cases, at least, criminal
penalties are unduly harsh: "Under present law, the willful failure to file any return
required by law is a criminal offense. The penalty provided is imprisonment not exceeding 1 year and a fine not exceeding $10,000. This criminal penalty is the only
sanction available in cases involving the failure to file foundation information returns.
Plainly, its severity makes it inappropriate in most such cases." TEAzsuty REPonr 64.
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might be set up on a sliding scale, but then the question of the basis for
the sliding scale arises (e.g., a fine of one hundred per cent of the
benefits of self-dealing, or five per cent of a foundation's improperly
accumulated earnings). 44 And finally, whatever the specific penalty,
consideration must be given to whether such penalty could be enforced. Charitable trustees, donors, etc., are almost by definition the
"pillars of the community." Assuming that the federal government
would be willing to label such persons as "criminals," there is doubt
that their fellow citizens and erstwhile beneficiaries would care to
convict.45 And all the more so where the crime is some vague offense
labelled, for example, as "undue delay in benefit to charity," or some
crime in which the public can see no moral wrong, such as borrowing
for investment or retaining control beyond the twenty-five year cut-off.
In some cases a non-income tax, similar to an excise tax,4 upon
trustees, donors, etc., would avoid many of the disadvantages of
criminal penalties while having roughly the same effect as a criminal
fine. For example, an "occupational tax" of appropriate severity might
be levied on those donor-related trustees who refuse to give up their
positions after twenty-five years. Or a "privilege tax" could be levied
on the proceeds from speculative transactions by foundations. Again,
such a tax would have to be carefully constructed so as to compel
compliance by the wealthy as well as the not-so-wealthy trustee or
donor. Perhaps a simple way out of this dilemma would be the
imposition of a prohibitively high excise tax on the donor or foundation
official for participating in proscribed activity, with power in the
Commissioner to determine where to impose the tax. Such a sanction
would be similar 47 to that of the present law, which the Treasury feels
is ineffective. However, the Treasury Report proposals would eliminate the vague standards of the present law and this, coupled with
the limited and specific penalty of an excise tax, might make such a
sanction desirable.
44. Cf. the fine suggested, id. at 63.
45. The following point made by Professor Karst re enforcement of civil sanctions
is a fortiori applicable to criminal penalties: "These are the same standards which
apply to the private trustee, and yet it is generally assumed (though it is beyond
proving or disproving) that enforcement of the duty of care against charitable trustees
has been less strict than against private trustees. Part of the reason may be that
the public does, indeed, owe its gratitude to men who, usually without pay, devote
their efforts to managing charitable works." Karst, supra note 21, at 460. See, however,
the apparently successful criminal penalties used in Ontario for divesting charities of
business interests, text accompanying notes 91-92, infra.
46. Precedents for such a tax are found in subtitle D of the Code.
47. In the sense that under present law it is up to the Commissioner to determine
whether one of the standards of sections 503 and 504 have been violated. Because
these standards are broad and rather vague, the Commissioner has considerable latitude
in deciding what actions must be prosecuted.
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D. Existing Sanctions
The sanctions for the present laws applicable to charitable founda-

tions are loss of exemption to the foundation and denial of deduction
to persons contributing to such foundations (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "existing sanctions"). This paper has as a basic assumption that these sanctions will not necessarily be exclusively applied as

the sole sanctions for enforcement of all the proposals.48 Although
in some cases these sanctions may be necessary, in many other cases
they will be too harsh, or ineffective, 49 and the result will be a net
loss to charity. Consequently, wherever possible the best policy would
be to tailor the sanction to the abuse. This approach was first adopted

in the 1950 amendments, 0 which allowed foundations to retain their
exemption and deduction privileges while at the same time taxing

their unrelated business income. Such a view seems also to be
shared by the Treasury, for a footnote to the Treasury Report states:
The provisions designed to insure compliance with existing law will have to
be reexamined to determine their adequacy to the task of securing compliance with the rules proposed in this Report. The fundamental objective
of such provisions should be to make certain that funds wbich have been
committed to charity and for which tax benefits have been granted will in
fact be devoted to charitable ends.51

It should be noted at this point that loss of exemption and denial
of deduction are not by their nature interdependent, and either could
be used alone. Or some new combination of the two might be
desirable, such as a temporary revocation of a foundation's exemption

for minor or inadvertent violations without a denial of deduction for
future contributions. Loss of deduction might follow later upon refusal
to terminate violations of a continuing nature (e.g., one donor-controlled member too many on the foundation's governing board).

Some support for the exclusive use of the existing sanctions in
implementing the Treasury proposals is found in the Canadian tax

laws. Our neighbors to the north already have in their law relating
48. However, since these sanctions are used exclusively (except in the limited case
of unrelated business income) at the present time, some consideration of them will
be found in the discussion of the specific proposals. The discussion of the existing
sanctions at this point is generally applicable to all the proposals.
49. "But what happens after tax-exemption is lost? The same individuals who have
been managing the funds remain in control. If they have been realizing personal
profits, they may continue to do so. Perhaps the amount of profit vill be reduced or
eliminated, and they may no longer be able to increase the charitable endovment while
enjoying a personal tax savings." Fremont-Smith, supra note 26, at 225. See Secretary
Dillon's comment on loss of exemption as a sanction for improper accumulations,
infra note 81.
50. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
51. TnRAsuny REPORT 3 n.9.
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to charitable foundations provisions similar to some of the proposals
made in the Treasury Report.5 2 The sole sanctions for these provisions
are loss of exemption and denial of deduction. The use of, and
apparent satisfaction with, these sanctions in a country having a
similar legal heritage and tax law (at least as to foundations), at the
least gives one pause in suggesting the complete inapplicability here
of these sanctions.
E. Injunction
A very good sanction might be the use of the injunction and the
federal courts' contempt power.53 This tool, or at least the threat of
it, has been used with success in other areas of federal law, most
notable the labor law-unfair labor practices field, to insure compliance
with the law. An injunction obviously would be a flexible instrument
in that the amount of the penalty could range from fines of any
amount to imprisonment, and the penalty could be levied on the
foundationlor on the individuals, depending upon whom the party at
fault was determined to be. A preliminary administrative hearing,
similar to that found in the labor law area, could be used to determine
the existence of the proscribed act, followed by resort to the federal
courts upon a failure to comply with any order thereof. This sanction
would be most effective in cases of a continuing violation, such as a
foundation's failure to divest itself of control of a business, or the
refusal of a donor-controlled foundation official to resign after twentyfive years.
Before passing to a consideration of specific sanctions for each
proposal, it must be noted that every conceivable sanction is not
discussed in regard to each proposal. In some cases this omission
represents a judgment that the sanction omitted has insufficient merit
in relation to the proposal in question to require discussion; in other
52. Unless the following requirements of the Canadian Income Tax Act are met, a
Canadian charity, including charitable foundations, will lose its tax exemption:
(1) Not less than 90% of the charity's income for the exempt period must be either
distributed to some other exempt organization or used by the charity "in respect of
charitable activities" of its own. Sees. 62(1)(f)(iii), (g)(iii). (2) The charity
can have no outstanding debts except those arising "in respect of salaries, rents and
other current operating expenses. Secs. 62(1)(f)(ii), (g)(ii). This apparently
would prevent any borrowing for investment. (3) The charity cannot be in control
of any other corporation (other than one given to it). Control is defined as 50% of
"issued share capital." The loss of deduction provision is section 27(1)(a). For a
general discussion of Canadian foundations, see McKeller, Charitable Foundations,
8 CA. B.J. 7 (1965).
53. This is the method that has been used in Great Britain since 1855 to enforce
the orders of the Charity Commissioners. Its use was continued under the Charities
Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58, § 41, despite the fact that the Nathan Report
found it to be too cumbersome in certain cases. NATHAN REPoRT 41-42.
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cases the above discussion of sanctions in general justifies the
omission.
III. SANCTONS FOR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

A. Self-Dealing
Under present law (section 503), transactions between a donor and
his foundation are not prohibited unless they violate certain rather
vague standards which are supposed to require an arms-length relationship between the two (e.g., "adequate consideration," "reasonable
rate of return," "adequate security"). The Treasury proposal would
eliminate these standards and completely prohibit all such transactions.
Such a prohibition was proposed by the House in 1950, but was
rejected by the Senate in favor of the present law.4 It has subsequently been adopted in regard to transactions between a self-employed person and his pension trust (section 503(j).
Furthermore, under present law no restrictions whatever are placed
upon persons other than substantial donors to, and creators of, foundations, and their relatives; and corporations controlled by such persons.
The Treasury proposal would extend section 503 coverage, most
notably, to officials of foundations and their relatives and officials of
corporations that are substantial contributors to a foundation.
Consideration of sanctions must first be given to the existing
sanctions-loss of exemption and denial of deduction-if for no other
reason than that these were the sanctions proposed for the similar
proposal made in 1950. 55 It is assumed that the imposition of such
sanctions would be prospectively effective only, that is, no deduction
or exemption for years prior to adoption of this proposal could be
denied for prohibited acts committed subsequent to adoption. Otherwise due process questions under the state and federal constitutions
would arise.
The disallowance of a self-dealing donor's deduction seems entirely
appropriate, for he has obtained the deduction and its tax benefits
on the assumption that his gift would thenceforth be used solely for
charitable purposes. Such disallowance would probably have to be
made retroactive (i.e., for any contributions made after adoption of
the proposal but prior to, as well as after, the self-dealing transaction)
in order to control those donors who make only one contribution
to a foundation; otherwise such donors, having made and received
a tax benefit for an untouchable past contribution, would not be
inhibited in their self-dealing activity. One modification of the
54. S. RE . No. 2375, supra note 14, at 36-38.
55. Ibid. Secretary Dillon's comment in note 81 infra indicates that the loss of exemption sanction may be out of favor with the Treasury re self-dealing.
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sanction would be to deny the deduction only to the extent that
the tax benefit received therefrom equalled the benefit received in
the self-dealing. This modification would make the sanction less
harsh than an absolute denial in that all past deductions would not
be denied because of minor benefits obtained by self-dealing; but
potential self-dealers would not be encouraged because of the
prospect of losing all the benefits of such self-dealing. In like manner,
future deductions could be allowed to self-dealing donors once the
prohibited benefit has been compensated for by loss of charitable
deductions on future contributions.The desirability of denying the foundation's exemption, however,
is not so clear. On its face, such a sanction seems logical, for the
exemption is given only on the assumption that all the foundation's
benefits will go to charity. On the other hand, unless the foundation
is already contributing nothing to charity, the sanction usually results
in a loss to charity, through the diversion of part of its income to the
government as taxes. An argument can be made that this short-run
loss to charity is compensated for by the eventual redistribution of
the funds by the government. However, the basic philosophy of
governmental favoritism of private charity is that there are some
things that private charity can do which the government cannot do,
or cannot do as effectively or efficiently. An obvious example is the
case of a foundation contributing most of its funds to religious activities. The tax the government would receive on loss of the foundation's
exemption could never be redistributed to religious activities in the
same fashion as the foundation's allocation, if for no other reason than
the constitutional prohibitions. Less obvious examples abound in
charitable programs which are too controversial or speculative for
government support. In all these cases it would seem that if the
foundation's contribution to charity is substantial, the applicable
sanction should be restricted to curing the specific abuse. In many
cases loss of exemption would have a much broader effect.
In addition, loss of exemption would not be effective in certain
cases: (1) If the foundation is willing to pay the tax. This situation
might arise where a controlling donor set up a foundation with the
secret intent to use it for his own purposes, hoping to obtain and
retain the exemption but willing to pay the tax if necessary. (2) If the
56. This modification would resolve some of the "tainting" problems pointed out
in the following quotation: "Must a foundation know all of the relationships, direct
and indirect, of every donor no matter how small his donation? Must it before accepting a donation make sure that the donor had no transactions, or is not related
to any person who had a transaction, with the foundation? How long must it keep
records for this purpose? How long will the taint of being a donor or related
to a donor prevent a person from dealing with a foundation?" Sugarman, I TREASURY
REPOr STATurs 471.
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foundation has insufficient assets to pay the tax. The lack of assets
might arise out of self-dealing transactions. (3) If the foundation
has no income.
On the other hand, loss of exemption would have some deterrent
effect in at least two situations. For the first, it must be remembered
that the self-dealing proposal would extend the coverage of section
503 to several groups which may be composed of non-donors (e.g.,
officials of foundations and contributing corporations). In such cases,
a denial of deduction sanction would be irrelevant, whereas loss of
exemption might have some deterrent effect: diminution of the foundation's income through tax payments reduces the power and prestige
of the foundation, and may also result in reduction of funds available
for foundation officials' salaries.57 The second case is that of a controlling donor to whom the advantages of self-dealing with a taxexempt organization outweigh the potential loss of deduction. 8 Under
such circumstances, the threat of loss of exemption has a force not
obtainable solely by denial of deduction.
While denial of deduction and loss of exemption do not necessarily
have to be combined as sanctions as under present law, the above
discussion suggests that if no other sanctions are employed, each of
the existing sanctions is a necessary complement to the other. Of
course, some combination of one of these sanctions with some other
sanction might prove effective, such as denial of deduction to donors
and an excise tax or criminal fine on non-donors. If, however, the
two existing sanctions alone are continued as the sole sanctions for
self-dealing, the following proposal made by one commentator prior
to the issuance of the Treasury Report seems an applicable and
appropriate solution to the problem:
As a general rule, the retroactive denial of exemption and the donor's
deduction should follow whenever the donor (or a related person . . .)

engages in a prohibited transaction, without reference to the donor's state
of mind at the time of his donation. Of course there will be cases in which

this sanction will be too extreme; some prohibited transactions will surely
be inadvertent, and retroactive sanctions will be too severe. As an escape
valve, the Commissioner should have the power to withhold the retroactive
sanctions when he determines (i) that the prohibited transaction was
inadvertent, and (ii) that to deny exemption and deduction retroactively
would cause undue hardship. In order to avoid manipulation of the general
three-year limitations period, a special long period of limitation should be
established for cases of retroactive denial of exemption and deductions under
57. Cf. Fremont-Smith, supranote 26.
58. A donor might be quite willing to forego the deduction in return for the
privilege of dealing with the income from his former assets, income which will now
be greatly increased because of the foundation's exemption.

19661

CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS

this section. Ten years might be an appropriate period, with a no-limitation
exception for cases of fraud. 59

If, in this excerpt, all parties covered under the Treasury's self-dealing
proposal are substituted for "donors," and if the Treasury is also given
the power to withhold the sanction upon finding that a serious loss to
charity might result, this proposal makes good use of the existing

sanctions. Such a combination of the sanctions has desirable attributes
in that it is completely retroactive, would be costly to self-dealing

donors, and yet is selective in nature through delegation to the
Commissioner of a broad discretionary power. Of course, it would
not prove effective in all cases, such as that of the non-donor selfdealer. This defect, however, is due to the limitations of the sanctions

employed and not to the proposal.
Two other sanctions which might be used in lieu of, or in combination with, the existing sanctions are allocation of the foundation's
tax liability, or its income, to the self-dealer. The following interesting proposal has been made in regard to the former:
If a foundation loses its exemption because it has participated in a
prohibited transaction with a donor, a member of his family (as defined) or
a corporation controlled by him (as defined), the donor shall be liable for
the tax payable by the foundation to the extent that taxes otherwise payable
by him were avoided by reason of deductions taken by him for gifts to
the foundation, with interest on the amount of the taxes thus avoided at the
rate of 6% from the dates on which the earliest taxes thus avoided were
payable.
If the donor fails to discharge the foundation's tax liability to the extent
indicated, the foundation shall be liable therefor, but, upon discharging that
liability, it shall have a cause of action therefor against the donor, any
provision of state law, any provision of the trust or corporate instrument
creating the trust, or any agreement between the donor and the foundation
to the contrary notwithstanding. Failure to enforce this cause of action
shall constitute a breach of trust for which each member of the foundation's
board of trustees or board of directors shall be severally liable, and the
Attorney General of the state in which the trust is administered, or his
delegate, shall be entitled to enforce this liability.6 0

An obvious purpose of this proposal, which attempts to shift the tax

burden from the foundation to the self-dealer, is the protection of the
charitable functions of the foundation. The proposal, however, assumes an alert state official who can and will know of any breach of
59. Karst, The Tax Exemption of Donor-Controlled Foundations, 25 OMo ST. L.J:
183, 204 (1964).
60. Proposal submitted by Professor David F. Cavers to his Trusts class, Harvard
Law School, March 31, 1965.
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duty on the part of the foundation's officials; as pointed out above, 61
such assumption may not be well-grounded. Consequently, it would
seem that unless some method is provided by which the appropriate
state officials are made aware of the breach of duty of foundation
officials for failure to prosecute the proposed cause of action, the
foundation will still bear the brunt of the tax. One possible solution
would be automatic notification of state officials by the federal government whenever the foundation's exemption is lost. 2
Assuming the notification obstacle can be surmounted, this sanction
is palatable because it taxes the party responsible for the imposition
of the tax. One minor inconsistency would be that the tax attributable
to the self-dealer would vary for the same amount of income depending upon
whether the foundation was organized as a trust or a corporation. 63 The self-dealer should not be heard to complain on this count,
however, for he will no doubt be fully aware of the breed of organization with which he is self-dealing.
Otherwise, this proposal seems more free from defect than any
other sanction in an area where no one sanction can be perfect. The
suggestion that the foundation have a cause of action against the
donor, in the event the foundation pays the tax, finds precedent in
section 2205, relating to reimbursement of estate beneficiaries who
have borne more than their rightful share of the estate tax burden.
It is doubtful, on the other hand, that section 503 should determine
what is or is not a breach of trust, but failure to enforce the cause of
action would probably be a breach of trust under existing state law.
A somewhat analogous approach would be attribution of the foundation's income to the self-dealing donor. The tax paid would not vary
with the form of the organization, as in the attribution of tax sanction
discussed above, but the tax would vary with the marginal tax bracket
of the self-dealer, and would be at the individual, rather than the
corporate, tax rate. A prime question here is what should be the outer
limits of the income attributed. It would seem harsh in some cases to
attribute the entire income of a foundation to the self-dealer. Perhaps
the amount of the attributable income should not exceed the amount
61. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
62. On a broader scale, the New York State Bar Association Section on Taxation
recommends: "To encourage the enforcement at the State level, the Internal Revenue
Service might be permitted to notify the appropriate State authorities of any irregularity discovered in audit and to furnish such information as it has to aid the State
in enforcement of State remedies." 2 TA.suRy REPOmT STATEFENTS 713.
63. That is, a foundation organized as a trust would be taxed at normal rates and a
foundation organized as a corporation could be taxed at corporate rates. This distinction is now made for the unrelated business income of foundations, INT. REv. CoDE or
1954, § 511(a), (b).
64. Because it is the income, not the tax, that is being attributed.
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of past or future deductions taken for contributions to the foundation.

This method would produce a different tax from the alternative
sanction of attributing that amount of income which would give
rise to a tax equal to the tax benefit received from the deductions.
This latter alternative would produce a tax equal to that arising under
the attribution of tax sanctions discussed in the preceeding paragraph.
Of course the income attributed to the self-dealer would only be used
for computing his tax, requiring him to produce the tax payment from
other sources. In other words, a result similar to that in the Clifford
Trust area.
Both these proposals are subject to the same weakness as the
denial of deduction: they are only effective against a donor who has
received a tax benefit in the form of a charitable deduction. For
non-donors to whom section 503 will now be extended, such sanctions
could be made effective only by attributing all of the foundation's
income or tax to such persons, 65 unless some other appropriate method
of setting the limits of the liability could be found. One limit, already
suggested in discussing the use of the existing sanctions for the selfdealing proposal,66 would be to limit the attributable tax or income
to no more than the amount of the benefit received by the non-donor
official from the self-dealing act. In all these cases, however, the
effect of such a limitation would be to reinstitute in the sanction
itself the vague arms-length standards which will be eliminated by
this proposal from the substantive provision. For example, in the
case of a purchase by a trustee of the property of his foundation, the
prohibited activity will by definition be assumed, but the same
problems as before will arise in determining the extent of the inadequacies of consideration given, if any. One solution might be to place
the burden of proof upon the self-dealer to show the extent of the
benefit received by the foundation in exchange for the benefit received
by the self-dealer, and to allocate to him the foundation's tax or income
to the extent that he could not prove an equality of benefits (up to
and including all of the tax or income).67 Of course, by limiting the
sanction to the extent of the benefit received, the sanction is negated
when the benefits surrendered equal the benefits received. In such
65. This sanction would be extremely harsh in many cases (e.g., a foundation with
$500,000 of income for the year and a self-dealing trustee of moderate means). Since
no income is actually received with which to pay the tax, there would be many cases
where no tax payments would result from such a sanction.
66. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
67. Cf. Hogan & Hartson, 1 TnEAsuRY REPoRT STATEmENTs 204. The presumption in favor of the Commissioner's correct assessment of the tax probably would
place the burden of proof on the taxpayer without any special provision. Perhaps a
stricter burden of proof (e.g., "clear and convincing") should be used in these cases.
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cases some further sanction, such as an excise tax or criminal penalty
may be required.
Some scattered sources have suggested that an analogy can be made
to the Clifford Trust provisions in imposing sanctions for self-dealing;6 8
it may even be that these provisions already have some application
in the charitable foundation field.69 It must be remembered, however,
that these provisions, found in subpart E of subchapter J, are applicable only to trusts; consequently, they are of no value in regulating
three-fourths7 0 of the charitable foundations which are organized as
corporations. Furthermore, there is some question whether the pro71
visions of subpart E are applicable at all to charitable trusts. Of
course, these problems could be remedied by changing the law if the
extension of the subpart E provisions to the charitable foundation

field is deemed desirable.
On the merits, it has been pointed out that if a donor retained, as a
formal matter, the powers which would render him taxable under the
subpart E sections, the organization would not initially qualify as a
charity under section 501(c) (3).72 Therefore, the principal effect of
such sanctions at that point would be to render the donor or creator of
a foundation (or other persons who have a section 678-type power)
taxable on the income of the foundation. 3 The same commentator,
68. 1 PATAAN REPORT 133-34, recommendation 9; Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, Comment
on the Patman Report, 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 190, 198 (1963); cf. Karst, supra note 59, at
206-11. Although most of the discussion of Clifford Trust doctrine re charitable
foundation centers around the problem of donor control of the foundation or a
foundation-owned business, one of the major abuses of such donor control is self-dealing.
69. Another method of reallocating income which could be used as the law now
is, and which presumably would be applicable to the Treasurj Report proposals, is
§ 482 (the "organizations" to which § 482 applies include exempt organizations).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)-(1) (1962). Young, Donor Foundation Dealings, N.Y.U.
22D. INST. ON FED. TAx 971-72 (1964), points out how § 482 might be employed:
"Section 482 strikes only at an improper exercise of control (resulting in misallocation of income or deductions)-i.e., transactions between donors and foundations
which are demonstrably not at arm's length. Insofar as the donor is attempting to
milk the foundation, the particular abuse is probably already identified as a prohibited
transaction. And there is ordinarily little to be gained by the Service in reallocating
this income to the foundation. The more usual situation for the application of Section
482 involves an effort by the donor to divert income to the foundation.. . . Here the
prohibited transactions rules are not an obstacle. Section 482 should be, but, in
the only discovered case -involving an exempt organization, its invocation was
thwarted by an interpretation of the control requirement [Stevens Bros. & MillerHutchinson Co., 24 T.C. 953 (1955)]." Mr. Patman in one of his proposals seems to
have in mind something akin to § 482 or § 532: "Exemption should be denied if a
foundation has been formed or availed of for tax avoidance purposes or to get
financial benefits for the contributor." 1 PATmAN REPORT 134, recommendation 10.
70. Karst, supranote 21, at 456.
71. Compare Young, Donor Foundation Dealings, supra note 67, at 988 with
Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, supra note 68, at 196.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 197.
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however, goes on to say that "we do not expose the shareholders of a
business corporation to this treatment, and there is no reason to
recommend it in this case."7 4 However,
A different situation is presented when the objectionable relationship to the
foundation arises after the creation of the foundation or when the retained
control offers a potential for securing private benefits in the future. On this
point there is a vast difference in philosophy and result between the rules
applicable to trusts and those applicable to the incorporated foundation.
For example, it is no answer to Representative Patman's proposal that
the powers listed in section 675 are for the most part covered by section
503(c). Under section 503(c) the incorporated foundation does not lose
its charitable status until it has in fact conferred the prohibited benefits
upon the creator. That the control retained by the creator offered a potential
for this is immaterial. Charitable deductions obtained prior to the taxable
year in which the exemption is lost are not recalled under section 503(e).

Even after the loss of the exemption, due to some prohibited transaction
which benefits the creator, the creator does not become taxable on the
income of an incorporated foundation-as he might if trust rules were ap75
plicable.

Adoption of a Clifford-type sanction would have no effect on the

foundation itself. In general it would have no effect on persons other
than donors and creators, except in the case of a provision like section

678. A further problem is that the Treasury proposal contemplates
no self-dealing at all between donor and foundation: the Clifford
sections allow such activity in limited cases where an "adverse party"
or person not "related or subordinate" has the right to pass on the

transaction. Consequently, some substantial modifications would have
to be made in the Clifford sections to fit them to the Treasury proposal.
On the other hand, the proposal itself might be modified so as to
allow self-dealing in such limited cases. A difficulty would arise here in
finding an "adverse party," for by definition there can be no direct
beneficiary of a charitable organization.76 A representative of the
state, which has the most interest in charitable organizations, might
sufflce,"7 but such an approach would require the filling of 15,000
74. Ibid.
75. Id. at 197-98 (Emphasis added.)
76. "The latter definition ["adverse party"] will be of no use to us in dealing with
the problem of controlled foundations; ordinarily, the only person with a "substantial
beneficial interest" in the funds and operations of a foundation is the attorney
general of the state on behalf of the public." Karst, supra note 59, at 207.
77. "The suggestion has been made that each foundation should be required to
have, upon its board, or as one of its trustees, a member selected by a government
agency, perhaps the state gd.ernnent. The purpose of the suggestion is that the
public would thus have a direct representative who could watch the operations of the
foundation and take whatever action he might deem necessary, if he found a violation
of good practice or of law. The suggestion may have merit.. . ." H.R. REP. No. 2681,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 215-16 (1954). See generally Karst, supra note 59, at 207-08.
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positions, and would inject an outside party into many of the affairs
of foundations which have nothing whatever to do with donor-foundation relations. Alternatively, the "related or subordinate" test could
be relied upon exclusively, but past experience in the non-charitable
78
trust area has revealed serious defects in this requirement.
In sum, it may be said that the Clifford provisions themselves are
not particularly suited for importation into the charitable foundation
area. On the other hand, the underlying principle of these provisions,
the taxation of the donor of a trust on his trust income 79in certain
circumstances, has merit, and is discussed separately above.
B. Delay in Benefit to Charity

Congress for some time has been concerned with the problem of
improper accumulations of income by foundations. The House version
of the Revenue Act of 1950 would generally have taxed that portion
of an organization's income (excluding capital gains and contributions) which the organization did not currently distribute for
charitable purposes. This provision was rejected by the Senate in favor
of the present section 504.80 Section 504 prohibits accumulations

which violate certain standards (e.g., "unreasonable in amount"),
and creates a negative implication that some kinds of accumulations
may be proper. The Treasury, in justifying the new proposal, contends
that the uncertain scope of these standards and judicial interpretation
of them have combined to make section 504 difficult to administer.
The discussion of existing sanctions in the self-dealing section of
this paper is generally applicable here.8' One point that should be
78. "Estate planners seldom have difficulty in finding 'independent' trustees who
are perfectly willing to do what the grantor of a 'Clifford' trust wants them to
do. In the foundation context, there is no reason to believe that the situation would
be different. Then is the answer to be found in a broadened definition of 'related or
subordinate parties'? Probably not. It is doubtful whether any such definition could
succeed, in view of the infinite number of possibilities for finding subservient directors
who have no formal connections with the donor.
Karst, supra note 59, at 207.
79. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
80. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-35 (1950). The Senate substituted the
disclosure provisions therefor: "Your committee has rejected this accumulations tax and
substituted for it the requirement that information disclosing the extent of accumulations must be made available to the public. Your committee does not question the
contention that some organizations are abusing their tax-exempt privilege by undesirable accumulations of income. However, witnesses before, and statements presented
to your committee brought out quite clearly that the measure passed by the House
was too inflexible and as a result would seriously injure many worthwhile educational
and charitable projects. . . . It is believed that publishing information about the
accumulations of these foundations and trusts will serve two purposes. First, full
public information will encourage distributions. Second, it will reveal the extent of the
accumulations problem." Id. at 34-35.
81. The Treasury apparently feels that the loss of exemption sanction is too
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noted is that the loss here of the foundation's exemption will result in
taxation of that portion of the foundation's income, albeit small, distributed to charity.
A more appropriate sanction would be a tax to the foundation on
that portion of its income which is not distributed, or, in the case of
unreasonably low rate of return from assets, a tax to the foundation
on the difference between what is earned (assuming this is distributed) and what should have been earned. In either case capital
gains would be excluded. Such a sanction would be similar to that
proposed by the House in 1950. Two variations of this sanction which
might be thought desirable would be the elimination of the difference
in tax treatment depending on the form of organization of the foundation, and an increased rate of tax for every year of non-compliance.
In any event, one questionable effect of this sanction is that in the
case of an unreasonably low rate of return an imputed income which
was never received would be taxed, thereby often 82 requiring payment
of the tax out of corpus.83 In such a case a conflict might arise between
the requirements of federal law and the terms of either the foundation's charter or trust instrument or state law.
The following sanction, which would avoid this problem, could be
substituted for the last-discussed sanction in such cases: A basis
would be established (e.g., the amount of the donor's deduction or
the fair market value of an acquired asset at the time of acquisition)
for the unproductive assets, which would be reduced annually by the
amount of the income which should have been earned, and the
foundation would be taxed upon the sale of those assets to the extent
of the difference between original basis and the basis at the time of
strict for the self-dealing and unreasonable accumulations area: "In all likelihood,
however, such a transaction would be a prohibited transaction, the penalty for which
is loss of the foundation's exception. That is one area I mentioned the need to study,
where the penalties may be too strict ....
[T]he courts have been very reluctant to ever
impose that penalty which presumably they found too strong, so the Treasury has been
eminently unsuccessful in legal cases in the courts in this area. We think some sort of
a different penalty there, maybe a penalty to tax certain accumulations that are not
distributed, would be much more likely to be effective than the present situation. This
may apply in this area [prohibited transactions] that you are talking of, too."
PATmAN HEARNG 20 (Secretary Dillon).
82. In some cases the return on the asset, even though below the required
percentage, will be of an amount sufficient to pay the tax on the imputed income,
thereby requiring no payment out of corpus. For example, if the required percentage of return is set at 3%, and a foundation asset worth $100,000 returns only
$1,000 in income, this would be sufficient to pay the tax on the $2,000 of imputed
income if the rate of the tax is 50%.
83. A foundation probably would not be able to borrow the money to pay the tax if
the proposal regarding foundation borrowing for investment is adopted. Note that
Secretary Dillon's suggestion in note 81 supra for a tax to the foundation on accumulations may be limited to amounts actually received.
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sale.84 Such a sanction would be consistent with the Treasury's view

that a foundation's use of low-income assets is often motivated by a
desire for capital appreciation, for such appreciation is often accompanied by, and to some extent created by, a low rate of return on the
asset (e.g., retention of corporate earnings in order to promote
expansion). Such sanction, however, would lapse when the cumulative
amount of imputed income finally exceeds the basis.
The above sanctions will be subject to avoidance, however, unless
some provision is made for denying to the foundation the benefit of
having a controlled corporation accumulate its income. 85 Under
present law, as the Treasury points out,
The restrictions . . . upon accumulations of income by businesses become
operative only where a corporation is 'formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders [sec. 532]'; where
shareholders of the business are themselves tax exempt, the limitations may
not apply. 86

It could be argued that with adoption of a new anti-accumulation
law such as this proposal, with a sanction that taxes the foundation
on the income which it improperly accumulates, the courts might be
inclined to find section 532 to be applicable to businesses having
exempt shareholders, for the accumulation of income by the business
would usually be for the purpose of avoiding the tax to the business's
84. For example, a donor contributes to the foundation stock having a fair market
value of $100,000, or the foundation acquires such stock with its own funds. The
foundation holds the stock for fifteen years, and receives $1,000 of income on the
stock in each of those years. In the fifteenth year the stock suddenly appreciates in
value, and the foundation sells it for $150,000. Assuming the required rate of return
to be the maximum suggested by the Treasury, 3 %, the imputed income for each
year would be $2,500, thereby reducing the stock's basis to $62,500 after fifteen
years. The amount of the tax on the $37,500, determined by subtracting the sale
basis from the original basis, would be $18,750, assuming a 50% tax rate. Note that
this amount exceeds the $15,000 actually received by the foundation during the
fifteen years, and would have required tax payments out of corpus if paid in
those years. Even under this approach tax payments would have to come out of corpus
if at the time of sale the asset has not appreciated sufficiently in value (in the above
example, at least $18,750), or if the asset is sold at a loss. In such cases an exception
could be made for the amount of tax which would have to be paid out of corpus.
Of course, if the asset is not sold this sanction will have no effect.
85. The foundation could increase the value of its stock in the controlled corporation, to charity's detriment, if the rate of return on the investment in the corporation
was higher than 3.5%, by directing the corporation to pay out no more than 3.5%. It
should be remembered here that the Treasury proposes to have a foundation pay out
all of its income, and that the 3.5% limit is merely the minimum allowable return.
If a foundation can restrict the income from its controlled corporation to the bare
minimum, the requirement that the foundation pay out all of its income to charity will
be partially ineffective in preventing undue delay in benefit to charity. If the excess
of income over 3.5% is retained in the corporation for valid business reasons (cf.
§ 532 of the Code), there is no cause for concern.
86. TimAsUmy REPORT 34.
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shareholder, the foundation. However, section 504 now has the indirect effect of making the foundation taxable on its income by
denial of its exemption, and yet the Treasury implies that additional
legislation is needed. So perhaps the best solution would be an
amendment to section 532 making it applicable to businesses owned
by foundations.8
An alternative approach which could have prospective effect only
would be a refusal by the Treasury to grant an exemption to a new
foundation unless the foundation's charter contains a provision requiring distribution currently of the prescribed percentage of its assets
for charity. Such a provision would induce foundation officials to
invest in assets with a reasonable rate of return and would open the
way for state action in the event such officials failed to comply with
their charter.
C. FoundationInvolvement in Business
The third proposal of the Treasury Report breaks new ground, for
there is no law at present restricting foundation ownership of a
business. 88 Previous discussion of the loss of exemption sanction has
application here. Loss of exemption would be especially effective in
the case of a foundation having varied business holdings, some of
which exceed the twenty per cent control limitation: loss of exemption
would mean not only the taxation of the income from the offending
stock, but also the taxation of the income from all other business
holdings. Consequently, such foundations subject to this sanction
might be quite willing to meet the twenty per cent test in order to
protect the income of their other holdings.
A criminal penalty of some sort seems more appropriate for this
proposal than for most of the others. For example, a fine of a specific
amount might be levied for each day of non-compliance. 9 The problems of criminal sanctions discussed above are less serious here than in
other areas, for the proof and definition of offense difficulties inherent
in criminal sanctions, are not as crucial, due to the limited and specific
87. Mr. Patman also recommended this sanction, 1 PArmAN REPORT 134, recommendation 15. The Treasury's objection to this sanction is not overly persuasive:
"Even if the accumulation restrictions of existing law were extended to these situations, their enforcement would require an arduous, case-by-case examination of each
separate set of facts." TREsURy REPoRT 34 n.21. Mr. Patman also suggested the
following interesting sanction, reminiscent of Clifford Trust doctrine: "For the purpose
of computing the accumulation of income, amounts unreasonably accumulated in
corporations controlled by a foundation should be added to the foundation's direct
accumulation as if the two were one." 1 PATMAN REPORT 134, recommendation 14.
88. Other than the requirement under § 501 that the running of the business not
be the primary function of the foundation.
89. Cf. TREAsu-y REPORT 64.
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nature of the offense (i.e., the retention by a foundation of twenty
per cent or more of the voting control or equity in a business). In
addition, the proscribed act here has anti-trust-unfair competition
overtones, 90 for which there is precedent for criminal penalties.
Some support for the use of criminal penalties in securing divestiture of the excess stock is found in the Charitable Gifts Act of Ontario.
Under this Act, whenever a business operated for profit is given to
any "person," including charitable foundations, such person must dispose of all but a ten per cent interest in the business.91 The sanctions
for failure to comply with the Act are a fine of 100 to 5,000 dollars,
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 92 The value of this
example as support for use of criminal sanctions in this area is somewhat lessened by the fact that the Act is not a tax statute and has
not been enacted at the national level in Canada.
A more appropriate sanction here, it would seem, would be to tax
the foundation on the income or rent from the excess stock93 or
property (the foundation would already be taxable under present law
on the income from unincorporated business assets it controls which
are unrelated to its exempt function). The obvious precedent for such
a sanction is the present treatment of unrelated business income
under sections 511-15. In fact, one method of imposing the sanction
would be the elimination of the exception for dividends found in
section
512(b) (1) for stock held in excess of the percentage limita.4
tion

This approach would go far toward reducing the competitive
90. See TREASURY REPORT 31-34; 1 PATAAN REPORT 9-18; Patman Hearings 5,
16, 58.
91. Ont. Stat. 1959, c. 50, § 2.
92. Ont. Stat. 1959, c. 50, § 9.
93. "If divestiture legislation is enacted, the committee believes that an appropriate
sanction for this type of legislation would be the imposition of a tax on the income
which a foundation derives from stockholdings exceeding the prescribed limit. Thus,
if a foundation owned all of the outstanding stock of a business unrelated to its
charitable activities after the permissive time for divestiture, the business would be
taxed at the normal corporate rates and, in addition, the foundation would be taxed
on the income received from the stock in excess of the prescribed limit. The rate
of the foundation's tax would be determined on a graduated scale, increasing with
each succeeding year of non-compliance." New York State Bar Association Section
on Taxation, 2 TREAsURY REPORT STATEN=TS 724.
94. The following recommendation by Mr. Patman can be interpreted as suggesting
this sanction: "Tax-exempt foundations should be prohibited from engaging in
business directly or indirectly. Foundations controlling corporations engaged in
business, through the extent of stock-ownership in those corporations, should themselves be deemed to be engaged in that business." 1 PATMAN REPORT 133, recommendation 2. That is, if the foundation is to be deemed to be engaged in the business
of its controlled corporation, the income from the corporation would be the foundation's business income; and if the business of the corporation is unrelated to the
charitable functions of the foundation, such income would be unrelated business
income. See also Baker, 1 TREAsURY REPORT STAT iirrrs 132.
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advantage foundations have over non-exempt businesses with whom
they compete. The Treasury, howevei, is concerned with other undesirable effects of foundation control of business, such as diversion
of foundation officials' time and attention to purely business matters.
Consequently, a stronger application of this sanction, such as a tax
rate higher than that presently applied to unrelated business income,
might prove more suitable. Or the unrelated business income approach
could be used in combination with additional penalties, such as
denial of the intercorporate dividend deduction for such income.
Under present law a foundation organized as a trust would not be
affected by such denial, so the appropriateness of this penalty would
be conditional on the equalization of trust and corporation tax treatment in this respect.
D. FinancialTransactionsUnrelated to CharitableFunctions
The Treasury proposal relating to financial transactions is aimed
at three specific abuses and calls for, it would seem, sanctions limited
to the abuses. On this assumption consideration of the exclusive use
of the existing sanctions is omitted.
The most direct and specific sanctions would be criminal penalties,
but in this area the problems of criminal sanctions mentioned above
would be present.95 However, about the same effect could be obtained
from the use of excise taxes levied on foundation officials for participating in such transactions. Such a tax could be measured by a
percentage of the benefit the foundation receives from the transaction
or, in order to penalize unsuccessful transactions as well, a percentage
of the sums borrowed, loaned, or used for speculation. This sanction
could be strengthened by increasing the rate of the tax for each subsequent violation.9 In extreme cases, or after a certain number of
violations, the foundation's exemption could be revoked.
In the alternative, the foundation itself could be taxed in the same
fashion for such transactions. Or the tax could be applied by use of
the unrelated business income provisions. At present, rental income
from assets purchased with borrowed money is included in unrelated
business income (section 514). This section could be expanded to
include income from any asset (e.g., securities) purchased with
borrowed money, income arising out of speculative transactions, and
interest from prohibited loans.9
95. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.

96. Cf. note 93 supra.
97. Mr. Patman suggested including in unrelated business income the income from
assets purchased with borrowed funds and speculative income. 1 PATMAN REPORT
133, recommendation 8. He apparently would want an absolute ban on foundation
lending, id. at recommendation 3.
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If such a sanction is adopted, the six-month holding period for
capital gains treatment apparently would be, or at any rate could be,
made applicable to profits from speculative transactions. The sanction
could be strengthened by lengthening this period for foundation
transactions, or by taxing all such profits at ordinary rates without
regard to the holding period.98 In order to discourage a "what have
we to lose" attitude as to speculative transactions, a penalty, such as
a tax of a percentage of the value of the assets, sums, etc., employed
in the speculative transactions, should be levied on unsuccessful transactions. 99
An even more effective, self-enforcing sanction of a non-tax nature
could be employed in regard to speculative transactions. The party
who buys from, or sells to, the charitable foundation could be given the
right to sue in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the
consideration paid for the property in cases of a sale by the foundation, or to recover the property itself in cases of purchases by the
foundation, with interest or rent thereon as the case may be. A party
bringing this action would be required to tender back to the foundation whatever he had initially received from it. In other words, a
statutory form of equitable rescission would be authorized. This
sanction would be self-policing in that any profit accruing to the
foundation through speculative practices could be, and presumably
would be, recovered by the party dealing with the foundation. No
further sanction for unsuccessful transactions would seem necessary
since the elimination of any chance for profit would no doubt be a
sufficiently strong deterrent.
Such a sanction imposed at the federal level would not be without
precedent, for this is essentially what is done under the Securities Act
to discourage improper sales of securities. 100 However, since speculative transactions by foundation officials are already regulated to some
extent by state law of fiduciaries, it may be desirable to have this
proposal adopted at the state level. This could be encouraged by
imposing the existing sanctions on such transactions in states not
having such a law, as described in greater detail above.
98. The suggestion has been made that capital gains treatment be conditioned on
the frequency of short-term transactions, rather than on a holding period. This would
allow a foundation to reduce its losses by a quick sale, if necessary, but would
penalize an excessive number of short-term transactions. Hogan & Hartson, 1
Tansuny REPORT STATEMENTS

222.

99. Otherwise foundation officials with a speculative propensity would be encouraged
to engage in the riskiest kinds of transactions, transactions certain either to provide a
profit in an amount to nullify the tax sanction or to result in a loss not penalized.
100. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
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E. Broadening of FoundationManagement
The Treasury's proposal for broadening foundation management
may be the most controversial of the lot. In proposing that donor
control over foundations be twenty-five per cent after twenty-five
years, the Treasury has three objectives in mind: the prevention of
subtle forms of self-dealing between donor and foundation, the elimination of socially useless foundations, and the infusion of new blood
into foundation management.
Loss of exemption would be less appropriate here than in any other
area, for in the vast majority of cases the foundation, even if improperly controlled, will be performing some substantial charitable
function. This charitable function may be socially desirable and worth
the cost of the exemption, and loss of exemption then would detract
from the performance of that function. The Treasury here is not
making a judgment that a foundation loses its usefulness after
twenty-five years if controlled by the donor, but rather that after
twenty-five years some person independent of the donor who is also
committed to the foundation should review the purposes and performance of the foundation. Loss of exemption would cut the heart out
of the foundation when only a physical examination is prescribed. As
for the donor's deduction, prospective denial of it here, as in other
cases, would be ineffective where the donor has no further contribution
in mind. Denial of the deduction retroactively would be unfair, since
at the time the past deduction was made the donor had every right
to make the contribution.
It would seem that the best sanction here would be one that
operates directly on the offending trustees. An occupational tax for
such officials has already been mentioned. 1 1 Criminal penalties would
have a direct effect, but are subject to some of the problems already
mentioned. 0 2 Earlier discussion of the use of injunctive proceedings
in the federal courts is applicable here. 10 3
Other more radical sanctions could be applied. The foundation
could be terminated upon a failure of the offending officials to resign,
or new officials could be permanently appointed by a government body
to replace old officials. A government agency could be given power
to exercise the offending officials' vote until such officials terminate
their positions.
None of these sanctions, either tax sanctions or others, would appear
quite as extreme if enacted at the state level. Since the federal tax
interest is hardest to define or justify in this proposal because of the
101. See text accompaning note 46 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 43 supra.

103. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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subtleness of the abuses intended to be counteracted, this proposal,
more than others, should be adopted at the state level. The above
1
discussion of methods for encouraging state action would apply here. '4
IV.

CONCLUSION

Though most of this paper has consisted of conclusions as to what
sanctions are applicable and appropriate, some more general conclusions can be stated here:
In many cases the choice of sanctions will depend upon what it
sought to be accomplished. For some proposals, it may be enough
merely to impose a sanction which places a burden on otherwise
legitimate activity, in order to secure voluntary compliance. For
others, the desirable sanction may be one that imposes an absolute
ban on the proscribed activity, either by making that activity illegal
or by some affirmative act on the part of the government to secure
compliance. To illustrate, the present sanctions for self-dealing do
not prohibit such activity, but rather make it costly by imposing a
tax. Such a sanction, perhaps modified by attributing the tax to the
party at fault, as described above, 10 5 would not seem inappropriate
for use with the new self-dealing proposal. Likewise, in the financial
transactions area, an extension of the unrelated business income provisions would be analogous. On the other hand, the Treasury seems
interested in securing complete compliance in the broadening of
foundation management and foundation involvement in business areas.
Perhaps this is due to the difficulties in defining and proving the abuses
and special benefits that result from such activity, and to the fact that
a less stringent sanction might prove ineffective or inordinately harmful to charity. Consequently a sanction likely to compel complete
compliance (e.g., injunction, criminal penalty, confiscatory tax) would
seem most appropriate.
Part of the problem in determining appropriate sanctions is that
the Treasury proposals are not limited to abuses which have a clearly
defined impact upon the federal tax laws and revenues. Rather, the
proposals must be viewed realistically as a call for wide reform in
the charitable foundation field, a reform which in many cases will have
an incidental, though perhaps important, effect on the federal tax
interest. Consequently, before a choice of sanctions is attempted, a
considered judgment must be made whether the proposals themselves
are appropriate for imposition by the federal government. Without
104. See text accompanying notes 26-31 s-upra. Cf. the Reece Committee suggestion,
H.R. REP'. No. 2681, supranote 77.
105. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
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straying too far from the subject of this paper, it must at least be noted
that most of these proposals would not seem unusual if made at the
state level. 10 6 From the point of view of sanctions, then, it would seem
logically to follow that in the beginning sanctions should be limited
to those designed to induce state action. If such sanctions fail in
their purpose, then resort could be made to other sanctions.
The suggestion has been made that if the Treasury's primary purpose in making the proposals is to induce compliance with the
conditions of exemption, then the sanction should simply be the
imposition of the tax. 107 This analysis is logically compelling, but
the ill-defined role of foundations in our society and the potential
harm to charity require that some of these conditions be modified or
abandoned in favor of lesser sanctions than loss of exemption. Consequently, the difficult search must be made for sanctions that will
effectively insure compliance with the proposal in question, and do
no more. Congress' approval in 1950 of the tax exemption for a foundation having unrelated business income was recognition that full
imposition of the tax does not always best serve the public interest.
This same view can also serve as a starting point in the search for
sanctions here. Or to put the point more musically, to say with the
Mikado of Japan, let the punishment fit the crime.
106. Professor Simon expresses the broader point most eloquently: "More generally,
a decent regard for the desirable features of federalism should make us wary of relying
on our federal tax system to perform jobs that might, with some extra help, be
handled adequately by existing state institutions. It seems hard to say that the need
for nationally uniform treatment of foundations is urgent enough to overcome such
diffidence. Nor do I believe that the fact of federal tax indulgence should sweep
before it all our scruples about decentralization of authority. Assuming that there
is a federal revenue interest in foundation asset productivity, it is hardly exclusive
of the traditional state interest and does not seem to me to justify federal absorption
of the policing role." 1 TREASURY REPORT STATEiMENTS 461.
107. Interview with Professor Albert M. Sacks, Harvard Law School.

